
Al ethics

Tae Wan Kim Associate Professor of Business Ethics Tepper School of Business


1. Coexistence?





EXCELL

The future trolley problem



- Sentience (Utilitarianism): The capacity for phenomenal experience or quaila, such as the capacity to feel pain and suffer.
- <u>Sapience (Deontology)</u>: A set of capacities associated with higher intelligence, such as self-awareness and being a reason-responsible agent.

qua·li·a /ˈkwälēə/

noun PHILOSOPHY

the internal and subjective component of sense perceptions, arising from stimulation of the senses by phenomena.

7 Starnore		cyclopedia of Ph	nosopny			
Browse 1 About Support SEP		Search SEP	۹			
Entry Contents Bibliography		Qualia				
Academic Tools		First published Wed Aug 20, 1997; s	ubstantive revision Mon Dec 18, 2017			
Friends PDF Preview	ď	Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk,				
Author and Citation Info	C	feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is <i>like</i> for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers				
Back to Top	~					
		qualia. Disagreement typically center intrinsic qualities of their bearers, ar outside the head. The status of quality	road sense of the term, it is difficult to deny t rs on which mental states have qualia, wheth d how qualia relate to the physical world bot a is hotly debated in philosophy largely becau f consciousness. Qualia are at the very heart	er qualia are h inside and use it is central to a		
		'qualia'. The second addresses the q brings out some of the main argume. The remaining sections focus on fun introspection, representational theory	ten sections. The first distinguishes various uestion of which mental states have qualia. T its for the view that qualia are irreducible and ctionalism and qualia, the explanatory gap, q es of qualia, qualia as intrinsic, nonrepresent ly the issue of qualia and simple minds.	he third section d non-physical. ualia and		
		• 1. Uses of the Term 'Qualia'				
		• 2. Which Mental States Posses	s Qualia?			
		 3. Are Qualia Irreducible, Nor 	-Physical Entities?			
		• 4. Functionalism and Qualia	-			
		5. Qualia and the Explanatory6. Qualia and Introspection	Gap			


• 7. Representational Theories of Qualia



Qualia by Neurohacker Collective: The Most Comprehensive Nootropic Stack Designed to and Mental Performance by Neurohacker Collective







GOPEN ACCESS 👂 PEER-REVIEWED


RESEARCH ARTICLE

Identifying Emotions on the Basis of Neural Activation

Karim S. Kassam , Amanda R. Markey, Vladimir L. Cherkassky, George Loewenstein, Marcel Adam Just

Published: June 19, 2013 • https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0066032

Article	Authors	Metrics	Comments	Related Content				
×								
Abstract								
Introduction	Abstract							
Methods	We attempt to de							
Results	We attempt to determine the discriminability and organization of neural activation corresponding to the experience of specific emotions. Method actors were asked to self-induce nine emotional states (anger, disgust, envy, fear, happiness, lust, pride, sadness, and shame) while in an fMRI scanner. Using a Gaussian Naïve Bayes pooled variance classifier, we demonstrate the ability to identify specific emotions experienced by an individual at well over chance accuracy on the basis of: 1) neural activation of the same individual in other trials, 2) neural activation of other individuals who experienced similar trials, and 3) neural activation of the same individual to a qualitatively different type of emotion induction. Factor analysis identified valence, arousal, sociality, and lust as dimensions underlying the activation patterns.							
Discussion								
Acknowledgments								
Author Contributions								
References								
Reader Comments (1)	These results su	ggest a structure for neura	I representations of emotion	•				
Media Coverage (2)	emotional proces	ssing.						
Figuree								





HAPPY


















Neurons



Artifical Neural Networks

The future trolley problem



- Sentience (Utilitarianism): The capacity for phenomenal experience or quaila, such as the capacity to feel pain and suffer.
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2. Al as scapegoat



Consider the following scenario: You are a person from a racially underrepresented group, say, X, and you recently applied to an online mortgage approval system and were rejected. The bank that hosts the online application system has recently started using AI to recommend mortgage applications for approval. You happened to know that the bank's approval rate for clients of the same race as yours has recently abnormally decreased, for no good reason. You meet with a representative of the bank and claim that the bank has racially discriminated against you, and that the bank should be held liable for the discrimination. The bank representative says that it is impossible for the autonomous artificial agent to discriminate racially against applicants, because the algorithms it uses were designed to be indifferent to the race of applicants. To prove that, in front of you the representative submits ten fake applications equally qualified as yours (as judged by independent human evaluators) that consist of 5 whites and 5 Xs. The AI accepts all white applicants but only 2 Xs. The representative looks puzzled.



The Scapegoat Argument

P1) "Agent A is responsible for Act X" means just that X is properly *attributable* to A in a way that renders A open to moral appraisal for performing X.

P2) Agent A is open to moral appraisal for Act X just when X is expressive of A's reflective or deep self or practical agency.

P3) Action X is expressive of Agent A's self or agency only when X identifies with A's desires, reasons, attitudes, or commitments that move A to perform X (whereas X is not expressive of A's self or agency when X does not identify A's desires, reasons, attitudes, or commitments, especially when A does not have volition or control over doing X or A cannot be aware of X).

P4) In the mortgage bank case, the racial discrimination was not expressive of any humans' desires, reasons, attitudes, or commitments, and none of the humans' practical identities moved the thinking machine to racially discriminate. (The humans did not have volition or control over the autonomous artificial mortgage appraiser's creating the emergent property of racial discrimination and the humans in the bank were not able to be aware of the autonomous machine's discriminative appraisal)

C) Thus, the humans in the bank are not responsible for the outcome action.




Principle of Fair Reciprocity

- If accidental or unforeseeable harm is an inevitable externality of freedom of action, a just society should implement a reasonable principle to fairly allocate the cost of unforeseeable harms.
- In a liberal society in which equal and free persons, who have different conceptions of good, live together, reciprocity is one of the few agreed upon principles. Reciprocity here means that *burdens must be borne by benefits.*
- The cost of unforeseeable harms created by a company that uses AI must be proportionately aligned with the benefit that companies and other parties gain by using AI.
- One efficient way to require companies that use AI to take the proportionate responsibility to remedy unforeseeable harms. By doing so, the burden is accordingly apportioned across companies and across customers who benefit from the companies' AI services.

3. Super-intelligence and "Existential risk"

Scope			
global	Thinning of the ozone layer	X	
local	Recession in a country	Genocide	
	Your car is stolen	Death	
	endurable	terminal	Intensity

Figure 1. Six risk categories



From HLAI to Superintelligence

	Median	Mean	St. Dev.
Within 2 years	10%	19%	24
Within 30 years	75%	62%	35

%	PT-AI	AGI	EETN	TOP100	ALL
Extremely good	17	28	31	20	24
On balance good	24	25	30	40	28
More or less neutral	23	12	20	19	17
On balance bad	17	12	13	13	13
Extremely bad					
(existential catastrophe)	18	24	6	8	18





The good-story bias

 "Our intuitions about which future scenarios are plausible and realistic are shaped by what we see on TV and in movies and what we read in novels.....We should then suspect our intuitions of being biased in the direction of overestimating the probability of those scenarios that make for a good story, since such scenarios will see much more familiar and more real." Nick Bostrom

